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INTRODUCTION

Within the state of Texas, there exist a great number of "peace officers" who are granted a wide range of power and authority, including the power to make warrantless arrests' and searches pursuant to
those arrests. Although the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure purports to define who is a peace officer 2 and the scope of his duties,3
significant ambiguity exists regarding a peace officer's jurisdiction.
This confusion is largely due to imprecise statutory language, 4 varying

judicial interpretations,5 and numerous overlapping, and sometimes
1. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01 (Vernon 1977)(peace officer may
arrest without warrant for any offense committed in his presence); id. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1988)(authority to arrest without warrant person found in suspicious places and under
circumstances that give rise to reasonable belief that person about to commit offense); id. art.
14.04 (Vernon 1977)(warrantless authority upon representation by credible person that felony
has been committed).
2. See id. art. 2.12 (Vernon Supp. 1988)(lists twenty-two categories of officials designated
as peace officers). Although Article 2.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure purports to be a
comprehensive list of who is a peace officer, numerous other statutes allow for the establishment of other officials not listed in article 2.12 as a peace officer. See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 21.483 (Vernon 1987)(security personnel of public schools can be appointed as peace
officers); id. § 51.214 (security officials for medical corporations); id. § 88.103 (Vernon Supp.
1988)(Texas Forest Service employees may be commissioned as peace officers).
3. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.13 (Vernon 1977)(duty to preserve peace
within jurisdiction).
4. Compare id. art. 2.13 (peace officer's power limited to preserving peace "within his
jurisdiction"; however, no definition of "jurisdiction" provided) with id. art. 14.01(b) (peace
officer has warrantless arrest authority for "any offense committed in his presence or within his
view"). None of the statutes granting a peace officer the power to make a warrantless arrest
ever limits that authority to his jurisdiction or to the situation where the officer is in the exercise of his duties. Cf id. arts. 14.01(b), 14.02 (Vernon 1977) & art. 14.03 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
5. Compare Love v. State, 687 S.W.2d 469, 477 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985,
pet. ref'd)(city police officers' jurisdiction confined to city limits) with Angel v. State, 740
S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)(city police officers have countywide jurisdiction);
compare also Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)(Section 153 of
Uniform Act Regulating Traffic does not confer statewide authority on all peace officers to
enforce provisions of act) with Hurley v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 315, 316, 234 S.W.2d 1006,
1007 (1950)(TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 803 (repealed), now Section 153 of Uniform Act
Regulating Traffic, empowers any peace officer arrest without warrant for any traffic offense
committed in his presence), overruled, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 732 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987).
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conflicting, statutes.6 For example, while some cases have held or implied that a peace officer has statewide authority to make warrantless
arrests for offenses committed within his presence or view, 7 other
cases limit both the peace officer's authority and status to a narrowly
circumscribed geographical area.'
Although the ramifications of a broad or narrow interpretation of a
peace officer's arrest authority impact several areas of law, 9 the most
critical and often litigated concern is the legality of warrantless arrests
and searches incident to those arrests, and, ultimately, the admissibility of evidence obtained subsequent to an unlawful arrest. 10 To ad-

6. Compare TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(a) (Vernon 1977)(authorizes peace
officer to arrest without warrant for "offenses against the public peace") with id. art. 14.03(c)
(authorizes warrantless arrest for violations of title 9, chapter 42, Texas Penal Code).
7. See, e.g., Buse v. State, 435 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968)(under TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b), peace officer has statewide authority to make arrest), overruled, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Hurley v. State, 155 Tex.
Crim. 315, 316, 234 S.W.2d 1006, 1007 (1950)(peace officer has authority to make arrest for
drunk driving anywhere in state), overruled, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 732 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1987).
8. See, e.g., Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)(campus peace
officer's authority limited to "property under the control and jurisdiction of the institutions of
higher education or otherwise in the performance of his duties")(quoting TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 51.203 (Vernon 1987)); Christopher v. State, 639 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Tex. Crim. App.
1982)(opinion on rehearing)(each peace officer's authority limited to "his jurisdiction"; thus, a
game warden has authority as peace officer only while in state park or at historic site); Weeks
v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 524, 526-27, 106 S.W.2d 275, 276 (1937)(city peace officer's authority
confined to limits of city), overruled, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987).
9. Whether a person is accorded peace officer status throughout the state is of considerable importance when a "peace officer" is charged with the offense of unlawfully carrying weapons. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.02 (Vernon 1974). Since this offense is not applicable
to a "peace officer," it is important to know whether a person commissioned as a peace officer
is a peace officer for all purposes. See id. § 46.03(a)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Most of the case
law on this point, while not often cited, holds that a peace officer is only a peace officer within
his jurisdiction, and thus, outside that jurisdiction the officer has no more authority to carry a
weapon than does any other citizen. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 240, 243, 238 S.W.
661, 662 (1922)(officer's authority to carry weapon exists only where in actual discharge of
official duties); Ransom v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 442, 444, 165 S.W. 932, 933 (1914)(officers'
right to carry arms with impunity limited to prescribed territory where employed); Ray v.
State, 44 Tex. Crim. 158, 159, 70 S.W. 23, 24 (1902)(officer is "peace officer" only while in his
own "bailiwick"). In Ray v. State, the court upheld a conviction of a Fort Worth peace officer
who was charged with unlawfully carrying a weapon while in the city of San Antonio. See
Ray, 44 Tex. Crim. at 159, 70 S.W. at 24. The basis of the court's opinion is that a peace
officer is only a peace officer while in the confines of his own bailiwick. See id. "Bailiwick" is
defined as "[a] territorial segment over which a bailiff or sheriff has jurisdiction; not unlike a
county in today's governmental divisions." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 129 (5th ed. 1979).
10. See, e.g., Christopher v. State, 639 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(opinion
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dress this concern, this article will describe the confusion and conflict
that exists concerning the scope of a peace officer's arrest jurisdiction
by reviewing the various statutory grants of authority and the judicial
interpretations of those statutes. The article then analyzes the current
state of Texas law in light of policy considerations and suggests ways
in which competing needs, legislation, and case law may be effectively
reconciled.

II. ARRESTS
A.

In General

The courts in Texas begin with the general premise that the constitutions of Texas 1" and of the United States,' 2 as well as the laws of
Texas, require that all arrests be made pursuant to a warrant. 4 Acceptance of this premise by the Texas Legislature is evidenced by its
enactment of limited exceptions to the warrant requirement. 5 Texas
courts have interpreted these statutes as requiring that a warrant be
obtained before an arrest is made, unless one of the limited statutory
exceptions applies.' 6 This has come to mean that the right to arrest
on rehearing)(evidence admissible when obtained as a result of defendant's arrest by game
warden for speeding), overruled on other grounds, Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1985); Irwin v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 6, 7-8, 177 S.W.2d 970, 974 (1944)(same),
overruled on other grounds, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 735-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987);
Weeks v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 524, 526-27, 106 S.W.2d 275, 275 (1937)(same), overruled on
other grounds, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); see also United
States v. Garcia, 676 F.2d 1086, 1087 (5th Cir.)(challenging admissibility of evidence obtained
by alleged illegal arrest by game warden), vacated on other grounds, 462 U.S. 1127 (1982);
Love v. State, 687 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet.
ref'd)(challenging evidence obtained when defendant arrested and searched by Pasadena city
police while in city limits of Houston).
11. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and possessions, from all unreasonable seizures or searches").
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures).
13. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 14.01-.02 (Vernon 1977) & art. 14.03
(Vernon Supp. 1988) & art. 14.04 (Vernon 1977)(lists statutory exceptions to general rule that
all arrests must be made pursuant to warrant).
14. See, e.g., Rental v. State, 656 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)(peace officer
must always obtain arrest warrant whenever possible); Hogan v. State, 631 S.W.2d 159, 161
(Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(same); Hardison v. State, 597 S.W.2d 355, 357 (Tex. Crim. App.

1980)(same).
15. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ch. 14 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1988); id. art. 18.16

(Vernon 1977).
16. See, e.g., Randall v. State, 656 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)(arrest illegal

because article 14.04 exceptions not met); Hogan v. State, 631 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex. Crim.
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without warrant in Texas is granted only by statute.'" Texas courts
have expressly held that warrantless arrests are "per se unreasonable,"" burdening the state to establish the legality of the warrantless
arrest. 9 The overriding principle behind the courts' approach is that
an arrest made without warrant threatens the constitutional right to
be free from unreasonable searches and arrests.2 0 A warrantless
arrest bypasses the safeguards provided by the warrant procedure, including the review and objective determination by a detached magistrate of whether probable cause exists to justify the arrest. 2 The
warrantless arrest procedure substitutes an after-the-fact judicial assessment of the reasonableness of the arrest or search, which may be,
or appear to be, influenced by the existence of incriminating evidence
which has already been obtained. 2 For these reasons, courts should
strictly construe each statutory exception to the warrant requirement,
and maintain the state's burden to persuade that one of the exceptions
applies.2 3
Although all states are bound by the federal constitutional guaran-

App. 1982)(officers failed to show defendant tried to escape, thus, failed to meet exception);
Honeycutt v. State, 499 S.W.2d 662, 663-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)(imminent escape essential
to warrantless arrest; otherwise, officers should get warrant when possible).
17. See, e.g., Heath v. Boyd, 141 Tex. 569, 571, 175 S.W.2d 214, 215 (1943)(warrantless
arrest must be expressly authorized by statute); Honeycutt, 499 S.W.2d at 665 (warrantless
arrest must come squarely within statutory classification); Giacona v. State, 164 Tex. Crim.
325, 326-27, 298 S.w.2d 587, 589 (1957), overruled on othergrounds, Tumlin v. State, 171 Tex.
Crim. 512, 513, 351 S.W.2d 242, 243 (1961)(warrantless arrest controlled only by statute).
18. See, e.g., McVea v. State, 635 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(unauthorized
warrantless arrest per se unreasonable); Honeycutt, 499 S.W.2d at 663-64 (constitutional precept that police should always obtain arrest warrants; statutory exceptions strictly construed).
19. See, e.g., McVea, 635 S.W.2d at 432 (state's burden to prove legality of warrantless
arrest); Hooper v. State, 533 S.W.2d 762, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)(burden on state to prove
warrantless arrest legality).
20. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)(warrantless arrests bypass safeguards
provided by probable cause requirement); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80
(1963)(constitutionality of arrests more reliable when police must obtain warrant); Honeycutt,
499 S.W.2d at 663-64 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)(warrants provide constitutional safeguards).
21. See Honeycutt, 499 S.W.2d at 664 n. I (warrantless arrest bypasses prior judicial determination of probable cause).
22. See Beck, 379 U.S. at 96 (objective of probable cause circumvented by warrantless
arrest); Honeycutt, 499 S.W.2d at 664 n. 1 (warrantless arrest bypasses prior judicial determination of probable cause).
23. See, e.g., Heath v. Boyd, 141 Tex. 569, 572-573, 175 S.W.2d 214, 216 (1943)(warrantless arrest exceptions noted); Honeycutt, 499 S.W.2d at 664 n.2, 665 (warrantless arrest exceptions arise from necessity); Giacona v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 325, 327, 298 S.W.2d 587, 589
(1957), overruled on other grounds, Tumlin v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 512, 513, 351 S.W.2d 242,
243 (1961)(arrest without warrant requires more than mere suspicion or belief).
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tee that citizens be free from unreasonable searches or seizures, Texas
has historically gone further than many other states by statutorily forbidding the state to use evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
arrest or search.2 4 Thus, for example, before evidence obtained from
a warrantless arrest will be admitted, the state must prove the existence and applicability of an exception to the warrant requirement."
B.

Statutory Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement

The Texas Legislature has acknowledged that certain circumstances, usually grounded in exigency, 26 justify the use of arrest powers even though a warrant has not been issued. Although some of the
exceptions are precisely worded and have been subject to strict interpretation,2" others are vaguely or loosely worded and inconsistently
interpreted,28 giving rise, in part, to the confusion that surrounds the
limits of the Texas peace officer's geographical arrest jurisdiction.2 9
Therefore, it is useful to briefly consider the various statutory excep24. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988)(statutory exclusionary rule). Even the recently enacted "good faith exception" to the Texas exclusionary
rule applies only to searches made pursuant to a facially valid warrant. See id. art. 38.23(b).
See generally DAWSON & Dix, TEXAS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 86-87 (1984).
25. See, e.g., Hogan v. State, 631 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(state must
show offender about to escape for article 14.04 exception to apply); Hull v. State, 613 S.W.2d
735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 198 1)(defendant's arrest after refusal to identify himself to police
violated fourth amendment); Williams v. State, 394 S.W.2d 510, 510 (Tex. Crim. App.
1965)(arresting woman for committing no other act than walking with man held invalid).
26. See Honeycutt v. State, 499 S.W.2d 622, 664 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)(cases of
necessity exist to prevent offenders' escape).
27. See TEX. CODE GRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.04 (Vernon 1977); see also Beasley v.
State, 728 S.W.2d 353, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)(police conduct cannot create likelihood of
escape); Starlling v. State, 719 S.W.2d 309, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)(going from "place to
place" not proof that offender about to escape).
28. Compare TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01 (Vernon 19 77 )(peace officer may
arrest without warrant for felony or offense against public peace when offense committed in his
presence) with id. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988)(peace officer may arrest persons found
in suspicious places without warrant on basis of reasonable suspicion that person is about to, or
has, committed some offense)(emphasis added).
29. The confusion surrounding the limits of a peace officer's territorial jurisdiction for
arrest is exemplified by tracing the history of Christopher v. State, 639 S.W.2d 932, 935 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1982). In Christopher,a panel of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that
article 14.01(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure creates the authority for any peace
officer to make an arrest anywhere in the state for any offense committed in his view. See id. at
935. On motion for rehearing, the court, en banc, disagreed with the panel's interpretation and
denied that article 14.01(b) granted general powers of arrest for any peace officer. See id. at
937. The court did hold, however, that article 2.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
grants statewide authority to any peace officer to make arrests for traffic violations. See id.
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tions to the warrant requirement.3"
1. Article 14.01(a)
Article 14.01(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes a peace officer, or any other person, to make a warrantless arrest
for any offense committed in his presence or within his view as long as
the offense is classified as a felony or one "against the public peace. "31
This provision appears to allow a warrantless arrest for these "onview" offenses regardless of a peace officer's status or jurisdiction. It
also clearly permits citizens who are not peace officers to arrest for
these crimes. In fact, the standard by which the court determines
whether the arrest is valid, and the evidence admissible, is whether a
normal citizen would have been justified in making the arrest.3"
Under this provision, then, an officer's power to arrest without a warrant outside his geographical jurisdiction seems to extend to any "onview" offense, except for misdemeanors that are not against the public
peace.33
Despite the logical import of the statute's language, the extent to
which article 14.01(a) permits a warrantless arrest outside the territorial jurisdiction of the peace officer remains unclear. Two factors contribute to this uncertainty: the jurisdictional boundaries of the
arresting peace officer and a determination of whether a breach of the
public peace has occurred. Regarding jurisdiction, it may be that the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals would now limit article 14.01(a)

Three years later, the court expressly overruled Christopher, holding that such general arrest
jurisdiction does not exist. See Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
30. For listings of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, see, United States v.
Charles, 738 F.2d 686, 694 n.8 (5th Cir. 1984)(arrest without warrant allowed in four situations); Heath v. Boyd, 141 Tex. 569, 572, 175 S.W.2d 214, 216 (1943)(exceptions to warrant
requirement noted).
31. Article 14.01(a) provides:
A peace officer or any other person, may, without a warrant, arrest an offender when the
offense is committed in his presence or within his view, if the offense is one classed as a
felony or as an offense against the public peace.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(a) (Vernon 1977).
32. See Romo v. State, 577 S.w.2d 251, 253 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)(peace officer outside
jurisdiction has same authority as citizen to make warrantless arrest). Under article 14.01(a),
an individual has the authority to arrest without a warrant for breach of peace committed in
his presence, but is limited to the time of the offense and does not authorize the right to pursue
and arrest the offender. See Woods v. State, 213 S.w.2d 685, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 1948).
33. See Heck v. State, 507 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974)(off-duty city police
officer arrested defendant outside city limits).
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warrantless arrests by peace officers, acting as peace officers rather
than citizens, to the officers' territorial jurisdictional boundaries.3 4
While that interpretation would be inconsistent with the way in which
article 14.01(a) has historically been construed,3 5 it would at least be
an internally consistent reading which would reconcile the treatment
of peace officers in articles 14.01(a) and 14.01(b). 36 However, such a
limitation would be practically ineffective since the creation of article
14.03(c)1 7 which grants officers statewide warrantless arrest authority
for certain offenses, thereby resolving any question about whether
peace officers, like other citizens, may arrest for felony offenses
outside their employment jurisdiction. It would also make little sense
to limit a peace officer acting under article 14.01(a) to arrests within
his jurisdiction when the same officer/citizen could act unofficially as
a citizen in making a warrantless arrest pursuant to the same statute.
Even if article 14.01(a) continues to be applied to peace officers, like
all other citizens, without regard to geographical limits, a second difficulty remains unresolved. For many years, the statute has provided
one of the few opportunities for warrantless misdemeanor arrests in
cases involving an offense against the public peace. 38 However, it has
never been clear which offenses are "against the public peace."
This uncertainty is illustrated by Woods v. State,39 a decision in
which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals approved a definition of
"breach of the peace":
The term 'breach of the peace' is generic, and includes all violations of

34. Such a limitation is applied to arrests pursuant to article 14.01(b). See Christopher,
639 S.W.2d at 937 (police officer acting pursuant to article 14.01(b) limited to his jurisdiction).
35. See Romo, 577 S.W.2d at 253 (peace officer outside jurisdiction has same authority as
any other person to make warrantless arrest under article 14.01(a)).

36. Both subsections refer to "a peace officer," but only article 14.01(a) permits the officer
to arrest in any place in which "any other person" might arrest. Compare TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(a) (Vernon 1977)(authorizing any person to make warrantless arrest
when "in view") and Romo, 577 S.W.2d at 253 (peace officer outside jurisdiction has same
authority as any other person to make warrantless arrest under article 14.01(a)) with TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 1977) and Christopher v. State, 639 S.W.2d
932, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(peace officer acting pursuant to article 14.01(b) limited to his
jurisdiction).
37. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
38. See id. art. 14.01(a); see also Romo, 577 S.W.2d at 253 (driving while intoxicated);
Hackett v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 414, 416, 357 S.W.2d 391, 392 (1962)(striking car with bottle); Woods v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 338, 341, 213 S.W.2d 685, 687 (1948)(assaulting person's
wife).
39. 152 Tex. Crim. 338, 213 S.W.2d 685 (1948).
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the public peace or order, or decorum; in other words, it signifies the
offense of disturbing the public peace or tranquility enjoyed by the citizens of a community; a disturbance of the public tranquility by any act
or conduct inciting to violence or tending to provoke or excite others to
break the peace; a disturbance of public order by an act of violence, or
by any act likely to produce violence, or which, by causing consternation'and alarm disturbs the peace and quiet of the community.4 °
While it may be possible to discern broad distinctions by application
of this "definition," it hardly facilitates an understanding of the statute's language to merely restate that language in various ways.
The outcome of relatively few cases has depended upon whether the
offense for which the arrest was made was one against the public
peace. In those in which the term was dispositive, it was decided that
offenses involving a breach of the public peace included a physical
assault in a public place;4 1 throwing a bottle from a moving vehicle
where the bottle struck a police car; 42 exposing one's genitals in a
public place;4 3 and, most recently, driving while intoxicated.4 If
there is a common thread in these cases, it is that in each instance the
offense was committed in a public place. Crimes against both property and persons suffice, and the disturbance of the "peace" apparently may be accomplished by a wide variety of conduct.4 5
2.

Article 14.01(b)

In 1967, the legislature amended article 14.01 to authorize a peace
officer to make a warrantless arrest for any offense committed within
his presence or view, regardless of whether the offense is a felony or
misdemeanor.4 6 This amendment expanded a peace officer's arrest
authority beyond that of an ordinary citizen's, enabling him to arrest

40. Id. at 341, 213 S.W.2d at 687 (assault on woman in public place is breach of peace).
41. Id.
42. Hackett v. State, 172 Tex. Crim. 414, 415, 357 S.W.2d 391, 392 (1962).
43. Romine v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 629, 630, 336 S.W.2d 181, 182 (1919).
44. Romo, 577 S.W.2d at 253.
45. It has been rare for a Texas court to reject an arrest because the offense was not
against the public peace. In Head v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, on motion
for rehearing, held that the refusal of a truck driver to obey a constable's order to drive his
truck to a public scale for weighing was not an offense which breached the peace. 131 Tex.
Crim. 96, 99, 96 S.W.2d 981, 982 (1936). Actually, the court concluded that the refusal was
not only not a breach of the peace, but was not an offense at all because the constable was
without authority to order the vehicle weighed. Id.
46. See Act of June 17, 1967, ch. 659, § 8, 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 1735.
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without warrant for all offenses, including misdemeanors. At least for
peace officers, this dispenses with the troublesome determination of
whether an on-view misdemeanor is one "against the public peace."
Not surprisingly, some courts had interpreted this amendment to
mean also that a peace officer has statewide authority to make a warrantless arrest for any offense committed in his presence, a reading
that is not illogical since the statute is silent on the matter of jurisdiction.47 The Court of Criminal Appeals, however, has rejected this interpretation and held that a peace officer's duties and powers are
limited to maintaining peace "within his jurisdiction"48 despite the
absence of any such limitation in article 14.01(b). Thus, with respect
to the article 14.01(b) grant of authority to make warrantless arrests,
and almost certainly under similar general grants of such power, including perhaps article 14.01(a), the peace officer's authority is circumscribed by his geographical or territorial jurisdiction.49 The
limits of this jurisdiction must, for each kind of "peace officer," be
determined by expressions of legislative intent apart from the general
grant of warrantless arrest authority. 0
3. Article 14.02
A peace officer is also authorized by article 14.02 of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure to arrest without a warrant when ordered to
do so by a magistrate for a felony or breach of peace committed in the
magistrate's presence. 1 This provision is of limited applicability and,
like article 14.01(b), fails to establish the geographical jurisdiction of
the peace officer or magistrate making or authorizing the arrest. 2

47. See, e.g., Green v. State, 490 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)(arrest outside
city limits); Buse v. State, 435 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968)(dicta), overruled, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)(arrest outside of jurisdictional

limits).
48. See Christopher v. State, 639 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(opinion on
rehearing), overruled, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 732-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); see also
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.13 (Vernon 1977).

49. Article 14.03(c) exemplifies an exception to the jurisdictional limitation because it
expressly applies to a peace officer acting "outside his jurisdiction." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 14.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
50. 740 S.W.2d 727, 732-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)(jurisdiction consists of geographic
scope of power, rights, and authority).
51. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.02 (Vernon 1977).
52. See id. art. 14.02.

1988]

TEXAS WARRANTLESS ARREST JURISDICTION

867

4. Article 14.03(a)(1)
Possibly the broadest grant of warrantless arrest authority to peace
3
officers is in article 14.03(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.1
Under this provision, a peace officer is authorized to arrest without
warrant any person found in "suspicious places and under circum-

stances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of
some felony or breach of peace" or that the person is about to commit
"some offense." '54 The article neither expressly limits a peace officer's
authority to act only within his jurisdiction, nor defines "suspicious
places." '5 5 Moreover, the statute does not require that an offense has
occurred, but only that the peace5 6 officer has a reasonable suspicion
that an offense is about to occur.

The enigma of article 14.03(a)(1) is due largely to two factors.
First, superficially read, the statute appears to permit a warrantless
arrest of any person found in a suspicious place or circumstance,
much like a "suspicious persons ordinance" would.57 Read more
closely, it is evident that the article does not create an offense; rather,
it permits a warrantless arrest for some offense defined elsewhere in
law when that offense is committed in a suspicious place or under
suspicious circumstances. This distinction is important in understanding article 14.03(a)(1), because it means that probable cause,
apart from the suspicious circumstances accompanying the offense,
must exist before any arrest may be made.58 In short, the statute is
merely an exception to the warrant requirement; it is not, and cannot
constitutionally be, an exception to the probable cause requirement, at
least not for a custodial arrest. 9
53. See id. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id.

57. For an example of a "suspicious persons ordinance" and its attendant constitutional
infirmities, see Howard v. State, 617 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
58. Article 14.03(a)(1) specifies that the arrest be made "under circumstances which reasonably show that such persons have been guilty of some felony or breach of the peace . ... "
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988). If the arrest is "custodial," the phrase "reasonably show" must mean that probable cause exists. If the "arrest" is
actually a temporary detention for investigation, "reasonably show" might instead mean that
reasonable suspicion exists. Id.
59. Cf Howard v. State, 617 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)("suspicious persons ordinance" patently unconstitutional for giving officer unbridled discretion in determining whether account of suspect is satisfactory).
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The second factor contributing to the confusion surrounding article
14.03(a)(1) is the final phrase of the statute which permits an "arrest"
when circumstances reasonably show that the arrestee threatens to
commit or is "about to commit some offense against the laws." 60 The
legislature surely could not have meant to imply that a custodial warrantless arrest could be made for an offense not yet committed. To
read the statute in that manner would be to interpret the language as
permitting an unconstitutional seizure. 61 Instead, the language is consistent with the United States Supreme Court's recognition that "reasonable suspicion" supports a temporary detention for investigation
before an offense has actually been committed. 62 If the legislature intended to provide statutory authority for a "Terry stop," 63 its use of
the word "arrest" may have sufficiently obscured that purpose to inhibit the article's orderly development along that line.64
5. Article 14.03(a)(2)
Article 14.03 was recently expanded to give peace officers broader
warrantless arrest authority when the officer has probable cause to
believe that a person has committed an assault upon another person,
resulting in bodily injury. 65 Prior to amendment in 1981, this warrantless arrest authority was qualified by the requirement that there
be an "immediate danger" of future bodily injury.6 6 This requirement
effectively nullified the intended grant of warrantless arrest authority,
especially in the area of domestic violence, because of the difficulty in

60. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
61. No logic exists in reading the language to cover inchoate crimes since such offenses
are complete, rather than threatened, at the moment the offender commits some act, amounting to more than mere preparation, that tends but fails to effect the commission of the offense.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.01 (Vernon Supp. 1988); REAMEY, CRIMINAL OFFENSES

23 (1987).
62. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1967)(unusual conduct leading police officer to
reasonably conclude criminal act may be committed by armed and dangerous person).

AND DEFENSES IN TEXAS

63. See id.
64. In Lara v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' opinion reflects uncertainty
about the correct meaning of "arrest" in article 14.03. See Lara v. State, 469 S.W.2d 177, 17980 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). The initial "arrest" of the suspect in Lara was clearly without
probable cause, but authorized by article 14.03. See id. The subsequent "arrest," which led to
a search incident to arrest, was based on an offense committed in the presence of the officer.
See id. at 180.
65. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
66. Act of June 11, 1981, ch. 442, § l(b), 1981 Tex. Gen. Laws 1865.
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establishing that further injury was imminent.67 In 1985, however,
the legislature amended the provision by removing the qualification
that the danger of future bodily injury be "immediate. ' 61 As
amended, the provision significantly broadens the peace officer's authority by permitting a warrantless arrest in all cases in which the
peace officer has probable cause to believe that there has been an assault, even though the officer has not witnessed the assault, if there is
"danger" of further bodily injury at some unspecified time in the
future.
6.

Article 14.03(a)(3)

A peace officer also has authority to arrest without a warrant when
he has probable cause to believe that a person has violated a court's
protective order relating to family violence, even if the offense is not
committed in his presence. 69 Formerly, there was no provision for
warrantless arrest of violators of such protective orders; the 1985
amendment partially closed this gap by giving Texas police officers
such authority.7 ° The subsection does not specify, however, whether
the arrest must be made in the territory within which the court issuing the order has jurisdiction, or whether the arresting officer must be
in his own jurisdiction or commissioned to serve in an area within
which the court issuing the order has jurisdiction.
7.

Article 14.03(c)

In 1987, the 70th Texas Legislature directly addressed the geographic arrest jurisdiction issue by again amending article 14.03. 7'
Unhappily, the amendment did not materially clarify existing jurisdiction ambiguities. Instead, it merely restated, in part, what was already the law in Texas. The statute now provides that: "[a] peace
officer who is outside his jurisdiction may arrest, without warrant, a
person who commits an offense within the officer's presence or view, if
67. See Reamey, Legal Remedial Alternatives for Spouse Abuse in Texas, 20 Hous. L.

REV. 1279, 1301 (1983)(immediate danger of further injury difficult to prove when abuser
temporarily flees scene).
68. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
69. See id. art. 14.03(a)(3).
70. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08 (Vernon Supp. 1988)(violation of court order
for defendant to knowingly or intentionally commit family violence, harass or threaten family
member or go to place described in protective order).
71. See Act of May 6, 1987, ch. 68, § 1, 1987 Tex. Sess. Laws 356.
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the offense is a felony or a violation of title 9, chapter 42, Penal
Code ... 72 This expression of arrest authority is redundant with
respect to on-view felonies, since any citizen or peace officer may
arrest without a warrant pursuant to article 14.01(a).7 3 It does, however, resolve the doubt existing over whether the authority extends
beyond the officer's jurisdictional confines. The redundancy may be
explained by the fact that the bill enacting article 14.03(c) also
amended the worker's compensation laws to include within the definition of "employee," "a peace officer employed by a political subdivision, while that peace officer is exercising authority granted under
Article 14.03(c), Code of Criminal Procedure. ' 74 It may be assumed
that the extension of worker's compensation benefits to police officers
making arrests outside their employing jurisdiction would encourage
those officers to exercise the authority they had long enjoyed but
rarely used. There is no similarly obvious explanation for the inclusion of chapter 42 misdemeanor offenses 75 within article 14.03(c).
While it may be that the legislature viewed these crimes as substantially the same as those "against the public peace," for which arrest
authority also existed in article 14.01(a), referring to such offenses dissimilarly in the two articles could only confuse what was already sufficiently ambiguous statutory language.76 If the legislature wished to
abandon the "public peace" limitation in favor of one more certain, it
should have done so completely by also amending articles 14.01(a),
77
14.02, and 14.03(a)(1).

72. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
73. See United States v. Charles, 738 F.2d 686, 694 n.8 (5th Cir. 1984)(warrantless arrest
permitted in four situations); Heath v. Boyd, 141 Tex. 569, 572, 175 S.W.2d 214, 216 (1948)
(notes exceptions to warrant requirement).
74. Act of May 6, 1987, ch. 68, § 2, 1987 Tex. Sess. Law 356.
75. Chapter 42 of the Penal Code includes the following offenses: disorderly conduct,
riot, obstructing a highway or other passageway, disrupting a meeting or procession, false
alarm or report, harassment, public intoxication, desecration of a venerated object, abuse of a
corpse, keeping a vicious dog, and interference with emergency communications. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 42.01-.12 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1988).
76. See id. Some of the offenses contained in chapter 42, like disorderly conduct, riot,
and public intoxication, are of the type that may be considered offenses "against the public
peace." See id. §§ 42.01-.02, 42.08. However, not all of the offenses fit neatly into that
characterization.
77. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 14.01(a), 14.02 (Vernon 1977) & art.
14.03(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988)(each permits warrantless arrest for offenses against the public

peace).
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Article 14.04

The Code of Criminal Procedure also authorizes warrantless arrest
upon the representation of a "credible person" that a felony has been
committed and that the offender is about to escape."8 This exception
recognizes the exigency that exists when an offender is about to escape
and the officer has reason to believe that there is no time to obtain a
warrant.7 9 The arresting officer need not have probable cause based
upon his own personal observation. If he does, he may usually arrest
under authority of article 14.01(b) or article 14.03(c).80 Article 14.04
permits him, instead, to rely entirely upon the representation of a
credible third party." As is true of other chapter 14 exceptions, this
provision does not specify whether the reported offense must occur
within the peace officer's jurisdiction or whether the peace officer
must execute the arrest within his jurisdiction.8 2 Given the difficulty
in deciding whether a person is "credible," and whether the offender
might escape, 3 the statute should be narrowly construed to prevent
its nullification of the warrant requirement.
9.

Article 18.16

The most significant exception to the warrant requirement found
outside chapter 14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure permits a
person to make a warrantless arrest to prevent the consequences of
theft. 4 Since the statutory exception empowers "all persons" with
warrantless arrest authority, it seems apparent that the peace officer is
not restricted to arresting for theft within his jurisdiction, but instead
has the same arrest authority that any other person would have.85
78. Id. art. 14.04 (Vernon 1977).
79. Id.
80. See id. art. 14.01(b) (peace officer may arrest without warrant for any offense committed within his presence or view); id. art. 14.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (peace officer may arrest
statewide for on-view felonies or violations of title 9, chapter 42, TEXAS PENAL CODE).
81. See id. art. 14.04.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Fry v. State, 639 S.W.2d 463, 467-68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(arrest justified
solely on representation of victim that assailants said they were going to leave town); Hogan v.
State, 631 S.W.2d 159, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(arrest conducted by officers who delayed
three hours between notification that defendant about to escape and execution of arrest, held
improper warrantless arrest); Honeycutt v. State, 499 S.W.2d 662, 663 (Tex. Crim. App.
1973)(improper arrest because arrestee in bed asleep and no sign that arrestee was about to
escape).
84. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.16 (Vernon 1977).
85. See id.
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The only qualifications to this statute are that the person making the
arrest must have "reasonable ground to suppose the property to be
stolen"; the arrest be openly made; and the arrested person be taken
before a magistrate "without delay."86

10.

Other Miscellaneous Grants of Warrantless Arrest
Authority

Various other provisions and statutes throughout the Code of
Criminal Procedure and Revised Civil Statutes authorize peace officers to make warrantless arrests in particular situations. For example, articles 8.04 and 8.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
authorize peace officers to arrest without warrant if necessary to disperse riots,8 7 or to prevent unlawful assembly or disturbances.8"
Likewise, section 153 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on
Highways provides that a peace officer may arrest without warrant
any person found committing a violation of any provision of the act.89
Until recently the courts had interpreted this provision to mean that
any peace officer, regardless of his jurisdiction, has statewide authority to arrest for traffic offenses created by the act.90 However, in Pres86. See id. The statute does not define "delay," but it seems unlikely that even substantial
delay will result in the exclusion of subsequently obtained evidence unless the defendant can
demonstrate harm or prejudice. See Dimery v. State, 240 S.W.2d 293, 295 (Tex. Crim. App.
1951).
87. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 8.04 (Vernon 1977). Arresting without warrant to disperse riot is authorized by article 14.01(a) since a riot is an "offense against the
public peace." See id. art. 14.01(a). Moreover, riot is an offense within title 9, chapter 42 of
the Texas Penal Code. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.02 (Vernon 1974). Therefore, an
officer may arrest without warrant for the offense anywhere within the state. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
88. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 8.07 (Vernon 1977). These offenses, like riot,
are "against the public peace" and may be the basis for a warrantless arrest by peace officers or
other persons. See id. 14.0 1(a). They may also fall within chapter 42 of the Penal Code. See
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.05 (Vernon 1974); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art.
14.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
89. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, § 153 (Vernon 1977).
90. See, e.g., Christopher v. State, 639 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(opinion
on rehearing)(Parks and Wildlife game warden has authority to arrest speeding violator even
though offense took place outside state park boundary), overruled, Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d
227, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Dillard v. State, 550 S.W.2d 45, 53 (Tex. Crim. App.
1977)(opinion on rehearing)(peace officer has authority to arrest for any speeding violation
committed in his presence); Hurley v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 315, 316, 234 S.W.2d 1006, 1007
(1950)(article 803, Vernon's Ann. P.C. (repealed), now TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art.
6701d. § 153 "authorizes any peace officer in the State to make an arrest of an offender, whenever and wherever the violation takes place in his view; and to do so without a warrant of
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ton v. State,9 1 the Court of Criminal Appeals expressly held that a

specially commissioned peace officer, such as a campus police officer
or parks and wildlife game warden, has no authority to make traffic
arrests outside the confines of his territorial jurisdiction.92 Implicitly,
the court left open the question of whether, for example, a city police
officer would have that authority, although there is no apparent reason to treat such officers differently. 93
C. Judicial Trend to Limit Exceptions by Jurisdiction
In light of the numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement, it
is obvious that the requirement that all arrests be made pursuant to a
warrant may be easily circumvented. Each application of an exception to the warrant requirement represents an instance in which a
prior judicial determination of sufficient probable cause to justify an
encroachment upon a person's liberty has been bypassed. 94 Nevertheless, exigencies often require that an arrest be made without the safeguards of the warrant process. 9 Although the legislature may have
intended to allow only limited exceptions to the warrant requirement,
the ambiguous wording of these statutory provisions has led some
courts to believe that the exceptions actually expand a peace officer's
authority and jurisdiction. 96 The most recent judicial decisions, however, tend to narrowly construe these grants of authority. 9 In Christopher v. State,98 for example, the court emphasized that the statutory
arrest")(emphasis added), overruled, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 732 (Tex. Crim. App.
1987).
91. 700 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
92. See Preston, 700 S.W.2d at 230 (expressly overruling holding in Christopher).
93. By implication, the court distinguished between specially commissioned peace officers, such as police officers and game wardens, and other nonspecially commissioned peace
officers. See id. The court, however, did not define which peace officers are "specially commissioned" and which are not. See id.
94. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 479 (1963); Honeycutt v. State, 499 S.W.2d 662, 664-65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
95. See Honeycutt, 499 S.W.2d at 664 n.2.
96. See, e.g., Green v. State, 490 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Buse v. State,
435 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968)(dicta), overruled, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727,
732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
97. See, e.g., Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d 227, 229-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)(section
153 of Uniform Act Regulating Traffic does not expand peace officer's jurisdiction); Christopher, 639 S.W.2d at 937 (opinion on rehearing)(article 14.01(b) of Code of Criminal Procedure
does not expand peace officer's jurisdiction); Love v. State, 687 S.W.2d 469, 478 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. ref'd)(city police officer's jurisdiction extends to city limits).
98. 639 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(opinion on rehearing).
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exceptions to the warrant requirement simply delineate the circumstances under which an arrest can be made without warrant. 99 These
statutes, the court held, neither delineate who is a peace officer nor
Rather, articles 2.12 and 2.13 of the Code
expand his jurisdiction.'
of Criminal Procedure simply confer the status of "peace officer."''"
The court noted that article 2.13 specifically limits the peace officer to
' 12
"preserve the peace within his jurisdiction."'
Moreover, the specific
statutes which define a particular peace officer's jurisdiction prevail
over the general grants of statutory authority defining exceptions to
the warrant requirement.' 0 3 Therefore, to determine whether a warrantless arrest was pursuant to one of the exceptions, it first must be
determined whether the peace officer was within his statutorily defined territorial jurisdiction. If the officer was not, it would seem that
the officer would have no more arrest authority than an ordinary citizen.'" 4 If the warrantless arrest does not fall squarely within one of
the statutory exceptions, all evidence obtained from that arrest must
be suppressed as a product of an illegal arrest, even if it is made by a
citizen rather than by an agent of the state.'0 5
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 2.12, 2.13 (Vernon 1977).
102. See Christopher v. State, 639 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(opinion on
rehearing), overruled on other grounds, Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Crim. App.
1985); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.13 (Vernon 1977)(powers and duties of
peace officers).

103. See Christopher, 639 S.W.2d at 937. Under the Texas Code Construction Act, if a
general provision conflicts with a special or specific provision, then the two provisions are to be
construed so as to give effect to both, and if the conflict is irreconcilable, then the specific

provision controls over the general. See TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 311.026 (Vernon 1988).
104. See Romo v. State, 577 S.W.2d 251, 252-53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). In Romo, a
peace officer for the lake patrol arrested the defendant for driving while intoxicated. Upon
challenge to the legality of the arrest, the court, acknowledging that the peace officer was
outside his jurisdiction, used the test of whether an ordinary citizen would have been justified
in making the arrest. See id. at 252-53. The court held that the arrest was legal because it was
an offense against the public peace committed in the presence of the arresting person, and
under article 14.01(a), therefore, the arrest was valid. See id. An officer would now also be
empowered to arrest without warrant anywhere within the state for felonies or violations of
title 9, chapter 42 of the Penal Code. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(c) (Vernon
Supp. 1988).
105. See, e.g., Hill v. State, 641 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982); Irvin v. State,

563 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). Even though the exclusionary rule embodied in
the fourth amendment of the federal constitution does not require exclusion of evidence obtained by an illegal search which is conducted by a nongovernmental entity, article 38.23 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires exclusion of evidence obtained by "an officer or
other person" in violation of any laws or provisions of the Constitutions of the State of Texas
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III.
A.

DEFINING THE PEACE OFFICER'S JURISDICTION

In General

Before defining a peace officer's jurisdiction, it is important to ascertain who can be "peace officers." Although article 2.12 of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure enumerates the various persons
who are peace officers, 1°6 the list is not exclusive."0 7 Throughout the

or the United States. See Hill, 643 S.W.2d at 419, aff'd, 641 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. Crim. App.
1982); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
106. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.12 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
The following are peace officers: 1) sheriffs and their deputies; 2) constables and deputy
constables; 3) marshals or police officers of an incorporated city, town, or village; 4) rangers and officers commissioned by the Public Safety Commission and the Director of the
Department of Public Safety; 5) investigators of the district attorneys', criminal district
attorneys', and county attorneys' offices; 6) law enforcement agents of the Alcoholic Beverage Commission; 7) each member of an arson investigating unit of a city, county, or
state; 8) any private person specially appointed to execute criminal process; 9) officers
commissioned by the governing board of any state institution of higher education, public
junior college or the Texas State Technical Institute; 10) officers commissioned by the
State Purchasing and General Services Commission; 11) law enforcement officers commissioned by the Parks and Wildlife Commission; 12) airport security personnel commissioned as peace officers by the governing body of any political subdivision of this state that
operates an airport served by a Civil Aeronautics Board certified air carrier; 13) municipal
park and recreational patrolmen and security officers; 14) security officers commissioned
as peace officers by the State Treasurer; 15) officers commissioned by a water control and
improvement district under Section 51.132, Water Code; 16) officers commissioned by a
board of trustees under Chapter 341, Acts of the 57th Legislature, Regular Session, 1961
(article 1187f, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes); 17) investigators commissioned by the
Texas State Board of Medical Examiners; 18) officers commissioned by the board of managers of the Dallas County Hospital District under section 16, Chapter 266, Acts of the
53rd Legislature, Regular Session, 1953 (Article 4494n, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes);
19) county park rangers commissioned under Article 6869d-1, Revised Statutes; 20) stewards and judges employed by the Texas Racing Commission; 21) officers commissioned by
the Texas State Board of Pharmacy; and 22) officers commissioned by the governing body
of a metropolitan rapid transit authority under Section 12, Chapter 141, Acts of the 63rd
Legislature, Regular Session, 1973, or by a regional transportation authority under Section 10, Chapter 683, Acts of the 66th Legislature, Regular Session, 1979.
Id.
107. An amendment in 1985 to the Commission on Law Enforcement Officer Standards
and Education evidences the legislature's awareness that this list is not exclusive. Compare
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (29aa), § 6(h) (Vernon Supp. 1986)(" 'peace officer,' for
the purposes of this Act, means any person employed or appointed as a peace officer under
law, including but not limited to a person so designated by Article 2.12 Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1965, or by Section 51.212 or 51.214 Education Code")(emphasis added)(repealed)
with id. art. 4413 (29aa), § 6(h)(Vernon 1976)(superseded)(" 'peace officer,' for the purposes of
this Act, means only a person designated by article 2.12, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1965
and by Section 51.212 Texas Education Code")(emphasis added). The fact that article 2.12 is
not exclusive has also been recognized by the Attorney General, who opined that reserve dep-
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Code of Criminal Procedure and Texas Revised Civil Statutes, other
persons are designated peace officers and are given the same duties
and powers as those listed in article 2.12.108 The most significant of
these, in terms of numbers of arrests made, are city police officers,
parks and wildlife game wardens, and campus police. The case law
dealing with these peace officers' jurisdiction illuminates the difficulties involved with the issue of arrest jurisdiction, and indicates the
analysis upon which the courts rely.109
Article 2.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure defines generally
the duties and powers of a peace officer. 110 Among other duties and
powers, the article provides that the peace officer is to "preserve peace
within his jurisdiction," and to make warrantless arrests "in every
case where he is authorized by law.""' Article 2.13 does not, therefore, define a peace officer's geographical jurisdiction; rather, it generally creates duties and powers which are applicable to all peace
officers listed in article 2.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or
2
elsewhere. 1
To determine the specific territorial jurisdiction of these peace officers, it is necessary to look to the particular statute which creates
their office. 113 The Code Construction Act" 14 requires that where a

uty sheriffs and constables, adult and juvenile probation officers and part-time peace officers
are all included within the meaning of the term "peace officer." See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No.
M.W.-54 (1979).
108. See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.483 (Vernon 1987)(campus security personnel for public schools); id. § 51.212 (Vernon 1987)(security officers at private institutions); id.
§ 88.103 (Vernon Supp. 1988)(security officers of Texas Forest Services of Texas A&M University System); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.121 (Vernon Supp. 1988)(railroad peace officers).
109. See, e.g., Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)(city police officers);
Christopher v. State, 639 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(game wardens), overruled, Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)(campus police).
110. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.13 (Vernon 1977).
111. See id. art. 2.13 (emphasis added).
112. See id.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 676 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 462 U.S. 1127 (1982); Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985);
Christopher v. State, 639 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(opinion on rehearing),
overruled on other grounds, Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); see
also Love v. State, 687 S.W.2d 469, 474-75 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. ref'd).
114. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.001-.032 (Vernon 1988). This code is applicable
to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 676 F.2d 1086,
1087, 1091 n. 16 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 462 U.S. 1127 (1982); Ex parte Harrell,
542 S.W.2d 169, 172 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Cuellar v. State, 521 S.W.2d 277, 279 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1975).
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general statutory provision conflicts with a specific one, the two provi-

sions, if possible, are to be construed so as to give effect to both provisions. I"5 However, if the two provisions cannot be harmonized, then
the specific provision controls. "6 Therefore, in determining a peace
officer's jurisdiction, the general statutes defining a peace officer's duties and powers, including those statutes granting an officer warrantless arrest authority, must be harmonized with the specific17 statutes
defining the nature and extent of his power and authority."
B.

City Police Officers

1. Common Law
The Texas common law 18 gave a peace officer no official power or
general arrest authority outside the geographical jurisdiction in which
he was employed. '19 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that both common law and statutory law limit a peace officer's
authority to his own "bailiwick" or geographical jurisdiction."'2 Furthermore, the court has held that a peace officer is a peace officer only
while in his jurisdiction; when the officer leaves that jurisdiction, he
can neither perform the functions of his office, nor carry arms with
115. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.026 (Vernon 1988).
116. See id.
117. See, e.g., Garcia, 676 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (article 12.102 of Parks and Wildlife Code
controls over general grant of authority to make warrantless arrest in article 14.03 of Code of
Criminal Procedure). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the specific provisions
of the Parks and Wildlife Code must control over the general grants of authority in article
14.01(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because to hold otherwise would "render meaningless all specific grants of authority." See Christopher, 639 S.W.2d at 937.
118. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 5.001 (Vernon 1986)(retains common
law not inconsistent with laws and constitutions of United States or Texas).
119. See, e.g., Buse v. State, 435 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968), overruled,
Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Irwin v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 6,
177 S.W.2d 970, 973 (1944), overruled, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 735-36 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1987); Weeks v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 524, 106 S.W.2d 275, 275 (1937), overruled, Angel
v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). See generally 2 RULING CASE LAW,
Arrests § 27 (1914). Other jurisdictions are in accord with this holding as well. See, e.g.,
McCaslin v. McCord, 116 Tenn. 690, 94 S.W. 79, 82 (1906).
120. See Weeks v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 524, 526-27, 106 S.W.2d 275, 276 (1937)(article
999 and common law limit city police officer's authority to area within city limits), overruled,
Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); see also Henson v. State, 120 Tex.
Crim. 176, 179, 49 S.W.2d 463, 464 (1932)(public policy favors limiting warrantless arrest
authority of peace officer to boundaries of city limits). But see Newburn v. Durham, 88 Tex.
288, 289, 31 S.W. 195, 196 (1895)(held laws of Texas, enabling city marshal with same jurisdiction as sheriff, abrogate common law restriction to confines of city limits).
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impunity.' 2 ' The only exception recognized in common law to the
general rule restricting an officer's authority to his geographical jurisdiction is "hot pursuit.' 2 2 In Minor v. State,'2 3 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held that if a police officer legally initiates the pursuit of an offender while inside the limits of his city (i.e., within his
jurisdiction), he may continue the pursuit outside the corporate limits
if necessary to effectuate the arrest. 24 The court emphasized that this
exception is available only when pursuit or arrest is initiated within
the city limits.' 5 Any further abrogation of the general common law
rule limiting arrest authority to an officer's bailiwick, the courts have
said, must be by legislative enactment. 26
These common law rules remain relevant because, unless a statute
expressly overrules or expands the common law rule, the rules of
common law apply and govern.' 27 Therefore, to more accurately define the contours of a police officer's jurisdiction, one must first determine whether the statutory provisions defining his authority abrogate
the common law rule.

121. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 240, 242, 238 S.W. 661, 662 (1922); Ransom
v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 442, 444, 165 S.W. 932, 933 (1914); Ray v. State, 44 Tex. Crim. 158,
158-59, 70 S.W. 23, 24 (1902).
122. See, e.g., Buse v. State, 435 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968), overruled on
othergrounds, Angel v. State 740 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Minor v. State, 153
Tex. Crim. 242, 249, 219 S.W.2d 467, 471 (1949)(Hawkins, J., dissenting); Love v. State, 687
S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. ref'd).
123. 153 Tex. Crim. 242, 219 S.W.2d 467 (1949).
124. See id. at 274, 219 S.W.2d at 470. But see id. at 248, 219 S.W.2d at 470-71 (Hawkins, J., dissenting)(advocates that any exception to common law rule limiting peace officers'
jurisdiction to within city limits should be legislatively mandated).
125. See id. at 472 (opinion on rehearing); see also Hurley v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 315,
316, 234 S.W.2d 1006, 1007 (1950)(hot pursuit exception not available where peace officer
initiated pursuit outside city limits), overruled on other grounds, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d
727, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
126. See, e.g. Newburn v. Durham, 88 Tex. 288, 289, 31 S.W. 195, 196 (1895); Hurley v.
State, 155 Tex. Crim. 315, 317, 234 S.W.2d 1006, 1008 (1950), overruled on other grounds,
Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Weeks v. State, 132 Tex. Crim.
524, 524, 106 S.W.2d 275, 275 (1937), overruled on other grounds, 740 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1987). As noted in the text and notes accompanying the discussion of article
14.03(c), the Texas Legislature has expanded an officer's warrantless arrest authority to encompass the entire state for felony offenses and violations of title 9, chapter 42 of the Texas
Penal Code where those crimes occur in the presence or view of the arresting officer. See TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988); see also supra notes 71-77 and
accompanying text.
127. See Love v. State, 687 S.W.2d 469, 471 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet.
ref'd); see also TEX. Cv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 5.001 (Vernon 1986)(common law
governs if not inconsistent with laws or constitution).
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Statutory Provisions

Until September 1, 1987, articles 998 and 999 of the Texas Revised
Civil Statutes provided for the appointment of city police officers and
outlined their powers and jurisdiction. 12 8 Due to the imprecise wording of these statutes, however, especially in regard to the officers' jurisdiction, there was significant confusion among courts as to the
effect of these provisions. 12 9 Article 998, for example, bestowed on
city police officers the same powers, authority, and jurisdiction as city
marshals. 3 ° The statute, though, neglected to define the extent of
that jurisdiction, or even what "jurisdiction" meant in that context.
Article 999, which defined the duties and powers of city marshals,
endowed city marshals with "like power, authority, and jurisdiction
as the sheriff."'' The sheriff, in turn, had "jurisdiction" over the entire county. 132 A cursory reading of these articles could lead to the
understanding that a city police officer had countywide jurisdiction.
However, it was unclear whether "jurisdiction" referred to the territorial boundaries within which the sheriff may arrest. The 70th Texas
Legislature, as part of its continuing effort to codify the statutes of
Texas, moved articles 998 and 999 to the new Local Government
Code.' 3 3 In doing so, it attempted to simplify the form of article 998
by outlining the provisions found in the existing law. 134 Section
341.001 of the new code now reads, in part: "[a] police officer has: (1)
the powers, rights, and jurisdiction of a marshal of a Type A generallaw municipality; and (2) other powers and duties prescribed by the
governing body."'' 35 The marshal of such a municipality possesses
"the same power and jurisdiction as the county sheriff to execute war-

128. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts. 998, 999 (Vernon Supp. 1987)(repealed 1987).
129. Compare Love v. State, 687 S.W.2d 469, 477 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985,
pet. ref'd)(legislature did not grant city police officers countywide warrantless arrest authority)
with Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)(legislature granted all city
police officers countywide arrest authority) and Lopez v. State, 652 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983), rev'd on other grounds, No. 509-83 (Tex. Crim. App., March
28, 1984)(not yet reported)(State's motion for rehearing pending).
130. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 998 (Vernon Supp. 1987)(repealed 1987).
131. See id. art. 999 (emphasis added)(repealed 1987).
132. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.17 (Vernon 1977).
133. See TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. ch. 341 (Vernon 1988).
* 134. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 998 (Vernon Supp. 1987)(repealed 1987)
with TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 341.001 (Vernon 1988).
135. TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 341.001(e) (Vernon 1988).
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rants, to prevent and suppress crime, and to arrest offenders.' ' 136 Reformation and codification of the prior language has obviously not
resolved the ambiguities existing in prior law. "Jurisdiction," as used
in section 341.001(e), remains undefined, and its meaning may be even
further obscured by the conjoining of "powers, rights, and jurisdiction" with "other powers and duties." Furthermore, the term is not
clarified by section 341.021(e), the subsection relating the "jurisdiction" of a marshal to that of a sheriff. 137 Section 341.001(e), moreover, applies only to "Type A general-law municipalities,"'' 38 a
designation previously unknown in Texas law.139 While Type A municipalities appear to be the most common, provision is also made for
Type B, 14° Type C,14' home-rule municipalities, 4 2 and special-law
municipalities. 4 3 The fractionalization of municipalities in the new
Local Government Code was unfortunately accompanied by fractionalization of the treatment of police officers within those municipalities. For example, no provision is made for a Type B general-law
municipality to maintain a police force;' only marshals are permitted,14 5 and the marshal's "power" is the same as that a "constable has
within a precinct."' 146 No reference is made in the new code to the
territorial jurisdiction within which the marshal of a Type B municipality may exercise his authority. Type C general-law municipalities
may "appoint police officers," and the governing body may "define
the duties of the officers," but nothing is said, directly or by reference
to the authority of another officer, about the territory within which
such police may arrest. 47 Even less is said about the officers of a
home-rule municipality. The entire legislative expression on the subject is that, "[a] home-rule municipality may provide for a police de136. Id. § 341.021(e).
137. See id.
138. See id. § 341.001; see also id. § 5.001 (definition of Type A general-law municipality).
139. For the definitions of various type municipalities, see TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE
ANN. ch. 5 (Vernon 1988).
140. See id. § 5.002.
141. See id. § 5.003.
142. See id. § 5.004.
143. See id. § 5.005.
144. See generally id. §§ 341.001-.903.
145. See id. § 341.022.
146. See id. § 341.022(a).
147. See id. § 341.002.
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partment." 4 8 This disparate treatment of city police officers confuses
an already obscure legislative intent regarding territorial arrest jurisdiction. This is especially troubling in light of the difficulty courts
have experienced in untangling the relatively simple legislative intent
knot created by previous statutes.
3.

Judicial Interpretation of Warrantless Arrest Jurisdiction

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently concluded that the
interweaving of loosely worded statutes, specifically articles 998 and
999, evidences the legislature's intent to expand the common law jurisdiction of city police officers to the entire county. 149 In Angel v.
State, 5' the court considered the arrest jurisdiction of Tomball city
police officers who observed a suspect operating what was later determined to be a stolen road paving machine outside the city limits of
Tomball, but within Harris County.'' Relying on the warrantless
arrest authority conferred by article 6701d, section 153 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways and article 14.01(b) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, the court concluded that the officers'
initial arrest for operation of road paving equipment at night without
lights was justified notwithstanding the fact that it occurred outside
the limits of the city in which the officers were employed. 52 The reasoning of Judge Campbell in Angel is relatively straightforward and,
in many respects, quite consistent with the traditional approach to the
issue. Statewide arrest jurisdiction for city police officers is not established by either article 14.01(b) or section 153.1"3 Authority to arrest
outside the geographical confines of the entity employing the officer,
therefore, must come from specific statutory expressions of "jurisdiction" or be controlled by a judicially recognized exception to the common law rule limiting city officers to their "bailiwick."'' 54 In the case
of city police officers, the "legislative expression of a peace officer's

148. Id. § 341.003.
149. See Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Lopez v. State, 652
S.W.2d 512, 513 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983), rev'd on other grounds, No. 509-83
(Tex. Crim. App., March 28, 1984)(not yet reported)(state's motion for rehearing pending).
150. 740 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
151. See id. at 728 (Tomball is within Harris County).
152. See id. at 731.
153. See id. at 732.
154. See id.; see also Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). The
continuing recognition of common law as a source of jurisdictional definition strongly suggests
the vitality of the "hot pursuit" exception.

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:857

jurisdiction" was, at the time of the decision, found in articles 998 and
999 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes.' 5 5 Since article 998 provided
that city officers have the same "powers, rights, authority and jurisdiction" as city marshals,' 56 and since article 999 conferred on city
marshals the same "power, authority, and jurisdiction" as the sheriff, 17 it followed that city police officers could arrest anywhere within
the territorial jurisdiction of the sheriff.'5 8 In other words, city officers, like sheriffs, enjoyed countywide arrest jurisdiction.
The validity of the conclusion of this syllogistic reasoning depends
upon its underlying premises. Specifically, as Judge Campbell's opinion recognized, the outcome depended upon whether "jurisdiction,"
as that word was used in articles 998 and 999, connoted a territorial
limitation rather than a description of the city marshal's/sheriff's
powers of office.' 59 Articles 998 and 999 determined territorial jurisdiction for city police officers only if "jurisdiction," as used in those
statutes, referred to "the limits or territory within which authority
may be exercised."' 60 The Angel court's decision, that "jurisdiction"
referred to territorial limitations, was supported for Judge Campbell
by the fact that using the term to mean "power, rights and authority"
would be redundant, inasmuch as those words were used in conjunction with "jurisdiction" in articles 998 and 999."6 Moreover, Judge
Campbell found this reading "more logical" in the context of the

statutes. 162
The redundancy argument is a strained one. The legislative drafters are not so consistently economical in their word choice that the
interpretation of a term should depend upon whether it may be
largely redundant; nor should it be assumed that the use is redundant

155. See Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 732-34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). As noted,

articles 998 and 999 have been changed and recodified. See

TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN.

ch. 341 (Vernon 1988); see also supra notes 128-148 and accompanying text. However, this
aspect of the Angel decision is important because the police authority of most municipalities
continues to be governed by statutory language substantially similar to that interpreted by the
Angel court.
156. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 998 (Vernon Supp. 1987)(repealed 1987).
157. Id. art. 999 (Vernon Supp. 1987)(repealed 1987).
158. Angel, 740 S.W.2d at 732-36.
159. See id. at 732-34.
160. See id. at 733 (quoting Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary definition of "jurisdiction").
161. See id. at 734.
162. Id.
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merely because overlap exists in the descriptive words of the statute.163 Using the court's reasoning in interpreting article 999, it is
interesting to note that "jurisdiction," as used in article 998, must
actually have meant "powers, rights, and authority." This definition
logically attaches because article 998, in a passage crucial to the
court's decision in Angel, stated, "[s]uch (police) officers shall have
like powers, rights, authority and jurisdiction as are by said title
vested in city marshals."' 164 The following sentence in article 998
read, "Such police officers may serve all process issuing out of a corporation court anywhere in the county in which the city, town or village is situated.' 1 65 If the preceding sentence meant, as the court
asserted, that city police officers have the same territorial "jurisdiction" as city marshals (and, in turn, sheriffs), then the subsequent sentence describing the places in which they may serve process was
redundant. And, of course, the legislature would not do a useless
66
thing.
The "context argument" suffers similarly. Judge Campbell illustrated his argument in Angel by quoting the language in article 999
that "[flor the purpose of executing all writs and process issued from
the corporation court, the jurisdiction of the marshal extends to the
boundaries of the county in which the corporation court is situated."' 67 This passage, with emphasis added in the court's opinion,
was apparently intended to demonstrate that "jurisdiction," as used in
article 999, referred to the "boundaries of the county." However, it
would be at least as logical to read "jurisdiction" in this context to
mean the "powers, rights, and authority" of the marshal.
Upon closer scrutiny of these statutes, and of a connected statute,
there emerges a legislative intent which is more in keeping with the
established common law rule. Neither of the statutes defining the du-

163. Judge Campbell noted that the court would not presume the legislature has done a
useless act. See id. at 734 n. 17. Of course, the act would be "useless" only if the meaning of
"jurisdiction" against which Judge Campbell argued is the one intended by the legislature.
164. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 998 (Vernon Supp. 1987)(repealed 1987); see also
Angel, 740 S.W.2d at 733.
165. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 998 (Vernon Supp. 1987)(repealed 1987).
166. Angel, 740 S.W.2d at 734 n.17 (emphasis added). This reasoning is admittedly as

"strained" as the redundancy argument made in support of the court's decision, a fact that
demonstrates the difficulty in confidently construing the legislative intent respecting territorial
jurisdiction of city police officers. This argument remains intact despite the codification of
articles 998 and 999. See TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 341.001(e), (f) (Vernon 1988).
167. Angel, 740 S.W.2d at 734 (emphasis in opinion).
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ties and powers of city police officers expressly granted countywide
arrest jurisdiction.'6 8 Instead, article 999 expressly stated that city
officers "shall be active in quelling riots, disorder, and disturbance of
the peace within the city limits.' 69 Further, as previously noted, article 999 expressly expanded the city officer's jurisdiction to the boundaries of the county for the purpose of executing writs and process
issued from the corporation court, but was silent as to any other expansion of his jurisdiction.' 7 ° This is implicit evidence of the legislature's intent to adopt the common law rule limiting the city police
officer's geographical jurisdiction to the city's
limits in all respects
17
other than for executing writs and process. '
Moreover, the statement that the city police shall "have, possess
72
and execute like powers, authority and jurisdiction as the sheriff,"'
can be read, perhaps more logically, to refer to the types of duties and
73
powers of the officers rather than to any geographic boundaries.

The ambiguity of the quoted language is attributable to the variety of
meanings attached to "jurisdiction." While the word may indicate
the territorial area in which powers may be exercised, it may also
74
describe the kind of authority a peace officer or court may exercise. 1

168. See TEX.

REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 998, 999 (Vernon Supp. 1987)(repealed 1987).
169. See id. art. 999 (emphasis added)(repealed 1987).
170. See id.
171. See Love v. State, 687 S.W.2d 469, 476 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet.
ref'd).
172. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 999 (Vernon Supp. 1987)(emphasis added)(repealed 1987).
173. See Love, 687 S.W.2d at 477. On original submission in Minor v. State, Presiding
Judge Hawkins of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals wrote in dissent:
As we understand it, the main opinion is based largely upon the holding of our Supreme
Court in Newburn v. Durham .... At the time said case was decided, Art. 363, R.C.S.
[Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. art. 999], among other things, provided that, ...in the prevention and suppression of crime and arrest of offenders he (the city marshal or police officer)
shall have, possess and execute like power, authority and jurisdiction as the sheriff of a
county under the laws of the state." The Supreme Court construed this language to give
to city officers the same authority to arrest and-to the same extent-as that which the
sheriff had. I am doubtful about this construction. It would, it occurs to me, be more in
keeping with other holdings of our court to have construed the statute to mean that
within the limits of the municipality the authority of the city officers was the same as that
of the sheriff in his county.
Minor v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 242, 249, 219 S.W.2d 467, 471 (1949)(Hawkins, J., dissenting).
174. For example, "jurisdiction" may refer to subject matter jurisdiction, a limitation on
the kind of case in which a court has power to act. Taken in a similar sense and applied to
peace officers, describing "jurisdiction" as like that possessed by a sheriff would limit the of-
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The existence of article 999b' 7 5 at the time Angel was decided supports construing "powers, authority and jurisdiction" as a limitation
on kind of authority rather than a territorial prerogative. The statute
provided for the establishment of an interlocal law enforcement assistance program, strongly suggesting that the legislature intended to
limit a city police officer's jurisdiction to the boundaries of the city
limits. Article 999b provided that neighboring municipalities may
agree to the establishment of an interlocal assistance program
whereby peace officers have arrest authority in two or more municipalities.176 In pertinent part, the statute provided that "a law enforcement officer employed by a . . . municipality . . . covered by an

agreement authorized by this section may make arrests outside the...
municipality... in which he is employed, but within the area covered
by the agreement.""' This provision necessarily implied that absent
an express agreement between municipalities a city police officer's jurisdiction was limited by the boundaries of the city limits. 7 s If read
in this fashion, the law in Texas adheres to the common law rule that
the city police officer's arrest authority is limited to the boundaries of
the city, absent the operation of some statutory exception like article
79
999b.1
The decision in Angel has certainly not permanently settled the
question of a city police officer's territorial jurisdiction, even if new
statutory warrant exceptions are disregarded. 8 ° In part, this is be-

ficer's warrantless arrest authority to cases of the same kind for which a sheriff could arrest
without warrant.
175. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 999b (Vernon Supp. 1987)(repealed 1987).
Article 999b has subsequently been codified in substantially the same form. See TEX. LOCAL
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 362.002 (Vernon 1988).
176. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 999b, § 2 (repealed 1987).
177. Id. art. 999b, § 3 (repealed 1987). This language has been retained, virtually unchanged, in Section 362.002 of the Local Government Code. See TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE

ANN. § 362.002 (Vernon 1988). Section 362.002 now reads, in pertinent part, "[a] law enforcement officer employed by a ... municipality ... that is covered by the agreement may
make an arrest outside the ...municipality ...in which the officer is employed but within the

area covered by the agreement." Id.§ 362.002 (c).
178. See Love v. State, 687 S.W.2d 469, 476-77 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985,
pet. ref'd).
179. See, e.g., Irwin v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 6, 11, 177 S.W.2d 970, 973 (1944), overruled
on other grounds, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 735-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Weeks v.
State, 132 Tex. Crim. 524, 526, 106 S.W.2d 275, 275 (1937), overruledon other grounds, Angel
v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Henson v. State, 120 Tex. Crim. 176,
178-79, 49 S.W.2d 463, 465 (1932); see also Love, 687 S.W.2d at 471-77.
180. For example, in the time since the Tomball officers arrested Silas Angel, the legisla-
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cause the Angel decision is of uncertain precedential value. Four of

the judges dissented on the jurisdiction issue,' 8 ' one judge concurred
without opinion,' 82 and three judges concurred with Judge Campbell
on the jurisdiction issue and dissented to his decision on a standing
issue.' 8 3 Angel is also suspect because it construed articles 998 and
999 to determine the legislative intent regarding arrest jurisdiction.
As discussed above, these statutes have been repealed, and similar,
but somewhat different, provisions adopted as part of the Local Government Code. 18 4 This latest expression of legislative intent will prove
even more difficult to construe. The increased difficulty with the new
code provisions is caused by the segregation of city types. 185 Some
kinds of municipalities apparently are authorized to have marshals,
but not police officers, 186 while others are permitted to have police,
but no reference is made to whether their "jurisdiction" is like that of
a marshal or sheriff.'87 Yet other cities may have police with authority apparently like that granted by articles 998 and 999. 8
This confusion suggests several observations about legislative intent
and territorial jurisdiction. First, it may be that the legislature did
not intend to address the territorial aspect of arrest jurisdiction at all
in articles 998 and 999, a possibility that is supported by the existence
of a rather extensive body of common law on the issue, none of which
was clearly overruled by prior statutes. If this surmise is correct, the
decision in Angel is wrong. It is also possible that the Angel court was
correct in its interpretation of articles 998 and 999,89 and that the
legislature merely wanted to distinguish in its new code between municipal officers with countywide jurisdiction and those with unspeciture has provided statutory statewide arrest jurisdiction for all peace officers in whose presence
or view a felony or violation of the Texas Penal Code, title 9, chapter 42, is committed. See
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).

181. Judges Duncan, Miller, Clinton, and Teague dissented. See Angel, 740 S.W.2d at
736, 739-49.
182. Judge White concurred separately without opinion. See id. at 736.
183. Judges McCormick, Onion, and Davis concurred in part and dissented in part. See
id. at 736-39.
184. See TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 341.001-.903 (Vernon 1988).
185. Id.
186. See id. § 341.022 (Vernon 1988)(no provision made for police for Type B generallaw municipalities).
187. See id. §§ 341.002, 341.003 (Type C general-law and home-rule municipalities).

188. See id. §§ 341.001, 341.021.
189. That is, if some unknown number of the judges who concurred in the result were in
agreement with Judge Campbell.
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fled territorial jurisdiction. However, this seems highly improbable in
light of the fact that the government code is completely silent on the
territorial limits of two classes of city officers. There is no obvious
reason why some city police would have arrest jurisdiction extending
throughout the county while others would not, or at least would not
have that authority stated in the same indirect way attributed to Type
A municipality officers.19 0
While Type A municipality police are governed by statutory language most similar to that previously found in articles 998 and 999,
even those officers may now have different territorial jurisdiction than
that recognized in Angel v. State.1 9 1 Section 341.001(e) of the Texas
Local Government Code provides that "[a] police officer has: (1) the
powers, rights, and jurisdiction of a marshal of a Type A general-law
municipality; and (2) other powers and duties prescribed by the governing body."' 9 2 The position of the court in Angel that "powers,
rights, authority and jurisdiction"1 93 in article 998 embodied expressions of territorial jurisdiction as well as control, 194 would seem to
dictate that section 341.001(e) be interpreted in the same way. However, subsection (e) concludes by recognizing that police officers have
the "other powers and duties" given them by the city's governing
body. 195 The conjunction of these subsections suggests that the "powers, rights, authority and jurisdiction" bestowed in the first was considered a subset of the "other powers and duties" referenced in the
second. If so, the legislature, in this latest expression of its intent,
arguably read "jurisdiction" as synonymous with "powers and duties," rather than as a reference to the territorial boundaries within
which such powers could be exercised.

190. The explanation cannot lie in the difference in training or qualifications of officers in
different kinds of cities since those matters are uniform throughout the state. See TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN. ch. 415 (Vernon 1988).
191. Compare TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 341.001(e) (Vernon 1988)(powers,
rights and jurisdiction of police officer congruent to marshall of Type A municipality) with
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 998, 999 (Vernon 1963)(repealed Vernon Supp. 1987)(police
officers given same powers, rights, and authority as city marshall to arrest without warrant all
violators of public peace); see Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 734 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)(interpreting articles 998 and 999 as authorizing city police officers to arrest without warrant
anywhere in county in which they are employed).
192. TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 341.001(e) (Vernon 1988).
193. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 998 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
194. Angel, 740 S.W.2d at 733-34.
195. TEX. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. § 341.001(e)(2) (Vernon 1988) (emphasis added).
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Finally, the recent codifications continued the possibility of an interlocal assistance agreement formerly found in article 999b. 196 As in
prior law, section 341.002 of the Texas Local Government Code provides that "[a] law enforcement officer employed by a ...municipality
...that is covered by the agreement may make an arrest outside the
•. .municipality.., in which the officer is employed but within the
area covered by the agreement." 197 This language certainly suggests,
as did that of the predecessor statute, that the legislature considered a
municipal police officer's arrest authority to be bound by the limits of
his employing city. In any event, the net result of the codification of
statutes on which Angel was decided, as well as article 999b, is a considerably less certain definition of the territorial arrest jurisdiction of
municipal police officers. Due to clearer expressions of legislative intent in the statutes creating their office, the difficulty in deciding the
issue for other kinds of officers is far less acute.
C. Parks and Wildlife Game Wardens
The office of parks and wildlife game warden was statutorily created.1 98 It did not exist at common law, and therefore it is governed
exclusively by statute.' 99 Prior to 1983, the Parks and Wildlife Code
provided that game wardens had the "powers, privileges, and immunities of peace officers while in state parks, on historical sites, or in
fresh pursuit of those violating the law in a state park or historic
site." 2°° Further, a game warden had the same authority as a sheriff
to arrest for any "violations of the laws relating to game, fish, and
birds."2 1 These provisions were interpreted as limiting the game
warden's jurisdiction geographically to state parks and historic sites,
and limiting his jurisdiction functionally to enforcing the laws relating
to game, fish, and birds.20 2 Additionally, the statutes expressly codi-

196. See id. § 341.002.
197. Id. § 341.002(c).
198. TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 11.019 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
199. See id.
200. Id. § 11.918(b) (Vernon 1976)(repealed).
201. Id. § 12.102(a) (repealed).
202. See United States v. Garcia, 676 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir.), vacated on other
grounds, 462 U.S. 1127 (1982); see also Christopher v. State, 639 S.W.2d 932, 940-41 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1982)(opinion on rehearing)(Clinton, J., dissenting)(opinion adopted in Preston v.
State, 700 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).
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fled the common law "hot pursuit" exception. °3
A panel of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in Christopher v.
State,2°4 recognized two other exceptions to a game warden's jurisdiction. First, the court held that article 14.01(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure enables a game warden, by virtue of his peace officer
status, to arrest without warrant for any offense committed in his
view, even if the warden is not in a state park.2"' This panel holding
was expressly overruled on rehearing. 6 The court sitting en banc
held instead that article 14.01(b) was not intended to create "a general
power for any peace officer to arrest without warrant. ' 20 7 Rather, as
a part of chapter 14, it merely delineates an exception to the warrant
requirement when an officer is effecting an arrest within his jurisdiction. '2 8 Somewhat surprisingly, the court also held on rehearing that
section 153 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic empowers a game
warden, because of his peace officer status, to make a warrantless
arrest of any person violating any provision of that Act in his presence.20 9 Section 153 was distinguished from article 14.01(b) on the
grounds that the former "expressly" grants arrest powers to "any"
peace officer, evidencing the legislature's intent to extend that authority beyond the usual territorial boundaries of the officer.21 0 The distinction was hardly persuasive because the only difference between the
two statutes is that section 153 authorizes a warrantless arrest by
"[a]ny peace officer .
," while article 14.01(b) permits exactly the
same thing by "[a] peace officer .... "211 In barely over three years,
the holding in Christopherrecognizing statewide arrest jurisdiction for
traffic offenses was overruled in Preston v. State.21 2 Thus, before the
1983 amendment to the Parks and Wildlife Code, a game warden's
jurisdiction was functionally and geographically limited by the word-

203. See TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 11.019(b) (Vernon 1976)(peace officer has
authority to arrest while in "fresh pursuit" of violator).
204. 639 S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App.), modified on rehearing, 639 S.W.2d 932 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1982)(opinion on rehearing).
205. See id. at 935.
206. See id. at 937.
207. See id. (emphasis in opinion).
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. Compare TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b) (Vernon 1977)(emphasis added) with TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, § 153 (Vernon 1977)(emphasis added).
212. 700 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
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ing of the statute creating the office, as was the jurisdiction of every
other "specially created" peace officer.21 3
In 1983, the Texas Legislature amended the Parks and Wildlife
21 4
Code and significantly expanded the game warden's authority.
Presently, section 11.019(d) permits a peace officer commissioned by
the director of the Parks and Wildlife Commission to "arrest without
a warrant any person in this state found in the act of violating any
law."' 21 5 On the face of the statute, the clear intent of the legislature
was to expand the game warden's authority and jurisdiction to the
boundaries of the state. This grant of authority contradicts the common understanding that a game warden is appointed to enforce the
Parks and Wildlife Code, not the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic,
Penal Code, or other statutes unrelated to parks and wildlife. The
statute certainly demonstrates, however, the way in which the legislature can express its intent respecting territorial jurisdiction.
Campus Police

D.

The Texas Education Code provides for the commissioning of campus police as peace officers.21 6 The various statutes providing for the
establishment of campus police officers generally contain language to
the effect that a peace officer is "vested with all powers, privileges, and
immunities of peace officers while on the property under the control
and jurisdiction of the institution. 21 7 This language has generally
been construed as a clear limitation of a campus peace officer's authority to the confines of the campus.21 8 In Preston v. State, 19 the

213. Id.; see Christopher, 639 S.W.2d at 938-39 (opinion on rehearing)(Clinton, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds, Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Crim. App.

1985).
214. Compare TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 11.019 (Vernon 1976) with id.
(Vernon Supp. 1988)(giving game wardens authority coextensive with sheriffs, and authority

for warrantless arrests).
215. See TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 11.019(d) (Vernon Supp. 1988)(emphasis
added). The statute also provides that, "[l]aw enforcement officers commissioned by the director have the same powers, privileges, and immunities as peace officers coextensive with the
boundaries of this state." Id. § 11.019(b) (emphasis added).
216. See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.483 (Vernon Supp. 1986)(peace officers commissioned by school districts); id. § 51.203 (Vernon 1972)(campus security for state institutions of higher education); id. § 51.212 (security officers at private institutions of higher
education).
217. See, e.g., id. §§ 51.203, 51.212 (Vernon 1987).
Preston v. State, 700 SW.2d 227, 229 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Op. Tex.
218. See, e.g.,
Att'y Gen. No. J.M.-239 (1984)(peace officers for school districts); Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No.
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court rejected the state's argument that a campus peace officer has
warrantless arrest authority for a traffic violation that occurs off the
campus of the institution./2 ° The court emphasized that a police officer's authority to act as a peace officer is limited by the statute defining his jurisdiction. 2 ' Further, the court rejected the argument that a
campus peace officer's jurisdiction was expanded in any way by section 153 of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic. 2
However, the
court in Preston recognized that the common law "hot pursuit" exception would apply to a campus police officer's jurisdiction in the
proper fact situation. 2 3
Concerning the meaning of the statutory phrase "property under
the control and jurisdiction of the institution," 2 4 the Texas Attorney
General has opined that this extends the authority of campus police to
facilities leased by such institutions for the times that the institution
maintains control over the facility.2 25 For example, a civic center
rented or leased by a university for the purpose of school basketball
games would be "property under the control and jurisdiction" of the
school, at least while it is controlled by the institution.22 6 Therefore, a
campus police officer for the institution is vested with all powers and
authority of a peace officer while on those premises during the university function.2 2 7
IV.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS-USING

JURISDICTION TO LIMIT

WARRANTLESS ARREST AUTHORITY

At least until the Angel decision, case law evidenced the courts'
tendency to use geographical jurisdiction to limit the peace officer's
M.W.-537 (1982)(warrantless arrest authority of campus peace officer at university functions
off campus).
219. 700 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
220. See id. at 230 (overruling Christopher v. State, 639 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1982)(opinion on rehearing)).
221. See id. at 229 (jurisdiction of campus peace officer for state institution governed by
section 51.203 of Texas Education Code).
222. See id. at 230.
223. See id. at 229 (under hot pursuit doctrine, if peace officer initiates pursuit within
jurisdiction, he may continue pursuit into another jurisdiction). Under the facts of Preston, the
hot pursuit exception was held not to apply because the pursuit was not initiated while on the
campus of the institution. Id.
224. See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 51.203, 51.205, 51.212 (Vernon 1987).
225. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. M.W.-537 (1982).
226. See id.
227. See id.
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authority, especially in the area of warrantless arrests. This approach
reflected the common law understanding that a peace officer is such
only within his own geographical jurisdiction.2 2 8 When faced with a
challenge to the legality of a warrantless arrest on the grounds that
the peace officer was outside his jurisdiction, a court should first determine whether the particular officer falls within the definition of
"peace officer" established by article 2.12 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure,2 2 9 or by some other statute.2 3 ° Since the statutory exceptions to the arrest warrant requirement do not generally operate to
expand a peace officer's authority beyond his jurisdiction,2 3 1 the court
must then determine from other legislative sources the geographic
boundaries of a particular peace officer's authority. For example, a
city police officer's jurisdiction may extend to the county limits, 232 a
campus peace officer's jurisdiction extends to the boundaries of the
campus, 233 and a county sheriff's jurisdiction extends to the boundaries of the county.2 34 Since the legislature has the authority to extend
or limit this jurisdiction,2 3 5 it is therefore necessary to examine the
statutes that specifically define the geographic or functional jurisdic228. See, e.g., Weeks v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 524, 526-27, 106 S.W.2d 275, 276 (1937),
overruled, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Henson v. State, 120
Tex. Crim. 176, 177, 49 S.W.2d 463, 464 (1932); Ransom v. State, 73 Tex. Crim. 442, 444, 165
S.W. 932, 933 (1914); see also 2 RULING CASE LAW, Arrests § 27 (1914).
229. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.12 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
230. See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 21.483 (Vernon 1987) (campus security for
public schools); id. § 51.212 (security officers at private institutions of higher education); id.
§ 51.214 (security officers for medical corporations).
231. See, e.g., Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)(section 153
of Uniform Act Regulating Traffic does not expand peace officer's territorial arrest jurisdiction); Christopher v. State, 639 S.w.2d 932, 937 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(opinion on rehearing)(article 14.01(b) of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure does not expand peace officer's
jurisdiction).
232. See Angel, 740 S.W.2d at 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). This assumes that the city
officer is employed by a Type A general-law jurisdiction and that the court would interpret
section 341.001(e) of the Local Government Code in the same way it interpreted articles 998
and 999 in Angel. As noted in text accompanying footnote 31, a city police officer may have
statewide arrest jurisdiction in some circumstances. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 14.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988)(on-view felonies and violations of title 9, chapter 42 of the
Penal Code); id. art. 18.16 (preventing the consequences of theft); id. art. 14.01(a) (on-view
felonies and offenses against the public peace).
233. See Preston, 700 S.W.2d at 230.
234. See Angel, 740 S.W.2d at 733; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.17 (Vernon
1977).
235. See, e.g., Hurley v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 315, 317, 234 S.w.2d 1006, 1008 (1950),
overruled on other grounds, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Love
v. State, 687 S.W.2d 469, 478 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, pet. ref'd).
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tion of a particular peace officer.2 36 For example, with regard to
peace officers of the Parks and Wildlife Commission, the legislature
has extended their jurisdiction to the boundaries of the state.2 3 Conversely, the legislature has expressly limited the authority of railroad
peace officers.2 38 Upon determining a peace officer's geographical or

functional jurisdiction, 239 the court can then determine the validity of
the arrest. If the arrest is made outside the peace officer's jurisdiction,
the arrest is presumptively illegal.2 4° If, however, the peace officer
initiated pursuit while within the boundaries of his jurisdiction, but
did not effectuate the arrest until outside those boundaries, the arrest
may be valid under the "hot pursuit" exception to a peace officer's
jurisdiction.' 4 ' If this exception is inapplicable, then the peace officer
would have the powers and authority granted any non-officer in making a citizen's arrest, as well as the authority conferred by article
14.03(c). 24 2 This authority to arrest extends to on-view felonies,243
on-view violations of title 9, chapter 42 of the Texas Penal Code, 2 4
other offenses "against the public peace, '245 and theft offenses.246
The complexity of the current rules, to the extent that rules can be
discerned, is demonstrated by considering the arrest authority of one
of the kinds of peace officer addressed in this article. A city police
officer of a Type A general-law municipality may execute a warrant236. See United States v. Garcia, 676 F.2d 1086, 1089-90 (5th Cir.)(analyzing functional
and geographical jurisdiction of game wardens), vacated on other grounds, 462 U.S. 1127
(1982); see also Christopher v. State, 639 S.W.2d 932, 939-41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)(opinion
on rehearing)(Clinton, J., dissenting)(opinion adopted in Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d 227, 230

(Tex. Crim. App. 1985))(outlines geographical jurisdictions of various peace officers).
237. See TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 11.019(b) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
238. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 2.121(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988)(railroad peace
officers have no authority to issuing traffic citations under TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
6687(b) (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1988) or under TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701(d)
(Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1988)).
239. The status of the entity for which the officer works may also be significant. See
Angel, 740 S.W.2d at 739-45 (Clinton, J., dissenting).
240. See, e.g., Weeks v. State, 132 Tex. Crim. 524, 526, 106 S.W.2d 275, 275-76 (1937),
overruled on other grounds, Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987);
Henson v. State, 120 Tex. Crim. 176, 178-79, 49 S.W.2d 463, 465 (1932).
241. See, e.g., Minor v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 242, 247, 219 S.W.2d 467, 470 (1949).
242. See, e.g., Romo v. State, 577 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)(peace officer
outside jurisdiction has same authority as citizen to make warrantless arrest); see TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. art. 14.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
243. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
244. Id.
245. See id. arts. 14.01(a), 14.02 (Vernon 1977) & art. 14.03(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
246. See id. art. 18.16 (Vernon 1977).
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less arrest in the following areas outside the municipal boundaries for
the types of offenses indicated:
247
(a) "on-view" felonies-statewide jurisdiction;
(b) "on-view"4 8 misdemeanors which breach the public peace-statewide
2

jurisdiction;

(c) "on-view" misdemeanor violations of 249
Title 9, Chapter 42 of the
Texas Penal Code-statewide jurisdiction;
(d) theft offenses (misdemeanor
or felony-need not be "on-view")250
statewide jurisdiction;
(e) all "on-view" offenses in which "hot pursuit" begins within municipal boundaries, and capture and arrest occurs outside those boundaries-potential statewide jurisdiction.25 '
In all other cases, a city police officer's warrantless arrest authority is
apparently confined to the county in which the employing municipality is located.2 52
V.

CONCLUSION-A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM

As is abundantly clear from the foregoing summary, a city police
officer's territorial jurisdiction for arrest purposes is an issue unduly
and unnecessarily complicated by the court's tracing of ambiguous
statutory provisions, and the potential for a similar result exists for
other kinds of peace officers. If any doubt exists about whether the
legislature intended the result reached in Angel, the significant policy
interests served by adhering to an interpretation consistent with Texas
common law surely militate in favor of a return to the relative simplicity and logic of that position. For example, confining a city police
officer's arrest authority to his "bailiwick" would be consistent with
common law, and arguably consistent with the Local Government
Code as well. Expansions of this arrest jurisdiction should be accomplished only by clear expressions of legislative intent as was recently
247. See id. art. 14.01(a) (Vernon 1977) & art. 14.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
248. See id. art. 14.01(a) (Vernon 1977).
249. See id. art. 14.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
250. See id. art. 18.16.
251. See Minor v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 242, 247, 219 S.W.2d 467 (1949).
252. See Angel v. State, 740 S.W.2d 727, 236 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). Note again that
this presupposes that the arresting officer is from a Type A municipality, and an interpretation
of the Local Government Code which coincides with the court's reading of articles 998 and
999 in Angel.
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done, for instance, by enacting article 14.03(c). 21 The adoption of
the Local Government Code presents the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals an opportunity to reconsider not only the proper interpretation of the vague "jurisdiction" language, but also the wisdom of an
expansion of the city officer's arrest authority beyond the limits of his
employing entity.
The 71st Texas Legislature will enjoy a similar opportunity. It
could eliminate much of the confusion surrounding the territorial
arrest jurisdiction issue by specifying in article 2.13 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure that Texas peace officers have warrantless arrest
authority only on property owned or governed by the entity by which
they are employed unless such authority is expressly expanded or limited by statute. Such a general statement of authority in article 2.13
would control over all but the specific grants of power contained in
legislation creating and defining the particular office in question. Specific expressions already exist in Texas law regarding some kinds of
peace officers.2 54 The Texas Education Code, for example, clearly delineates the areas in which peace officers commissioned under its au2 5
thority may exercise their "powers, privileges, and immunities. 1
The difficult statutory construction problems reflected by the Angel
decision are notably lacking in decisions interpreting the territorial
jurisdiction of campus police officers.2 56 With respect to municipal
police, the legislature should also amend chapter 341 of the Local
Government Code to provide, as in article 2.13, that unless statutory
exceptions are created, city police officers are limited in the exercise of
their warrantless arrest authority to the confines of the municipality
for which they work. This would affect neither the "hot pursuit" exception, the statewide arrest authority provided by article 14.03(c) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, nor the court's prior interpretations
of articles 14.01(a) (citizen's arrest for felonies and offenses against
the public peace) or 18.16 (preventing the consequences of theft). It
would, however, avoid the likelihood that language used in the Local

253. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.03(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
254. See, e.g., TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN. § 11.019(d) (Vernon Supp. 1988)(game
wardens have statewide arrest jurisdiction for any offense); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art.
2.121(c) (Vernon Supp. 1988)(railroad officers have no authority to issue citations for traffic
violations that occur in their view or on railroad property).
255. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 51.203, 51.212 (Vernon 1987).
256. See, e.g., Preston v. State, 700 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Op. Tex. Att'y
Gen. No. J.M.-239 (1984); Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. J.M.-537 (1982).
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Government Code will be interpreted to provide different territorial
arrest limits for officers of different types of municipalities. It would
also simplify the court's task of determining the effect on city officers'
territorial jurisdiction of subsequently enacted statutes. Moreover,
carefully restricting warrantless arrests preserves the important role
of prior judicial review of warrant applications. These relatively modest changes would bring a clarity and certainty to Texas arrest law
that does not now exist. This is especially desirable when the stakes
are individual liberty and effective law enforcement.

